DOI: 10.1097/01.jom.0000079087.95532.a0
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PMID: 12855906
Issn Print: 1076-2752
Publication Date: 2003/07/01
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Excerpt
In February of last year, The American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine (ACOEM) joined with the Western Occupational and Environmental Medicine Association (WOEMA) and the California Society of Industrial Medicine and Surgery (CSIMS) to prepare and submit a brief amicus curiae in the case of Chevron USA, Inc. v. Mario Echazabal1 before the Supreme Court of the United States.
An amicus curiae brief literally means one submitted by a “friend of the court” and is prepared by a party that is not directly involved in the outcome of the litigation. It is written to help the Justices understand the background, context, and policy implications of the question before the Court.
Because of the far-ranging impact of most Supreme Court opinions, national organizations routinely submit such briefs in cases in which they have a policy interest or an expert opinion. For example, the relevant concept of a “direct threat” exclusion and its elements were first articulated in an amicus brief submitted by the American Medical Association in a previous Supreme Court case addressing disability discrimination in employment under The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 2
The brief, submitted by ACOEM, WOEMA, and CSIMS, addressed two key legal issues in the Echazabal case. First, and most importantly, the brief addresses the primary issue presented in Echazabal, that is, whether or not the ADA permits a “direct threat” exception where the threat of substantial harm is to the worker’s own health and safety and not that of coworkers or the public. Although the ADA itself does not explicitly recognize this exception, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recognized a longstanding public policy and standard of practice that permitted exclusion where the worker was at significant risk of substantial harm that could not be eliminated through reasonable accommodation. 3 The brief submitted by the College did not address whether or not such a risk existed in the Echazabal case, but addressed this issue instead from a general perspective to preserve the employers’ and physicians’ ability to prevent employment in a position of unjustifiable risk. Without a “direct threat to self” exception, employers and occupational physicians would find themselves in a morally untenable position where they could not protect a worker from entering a environment where there was significant risk of injury, illness, or death.
Second, unless third parties have the ability to rely on the judgment and recommendations of occupational physicians who are professionally and ethically bound to protect the health and safety of workers, their families, and their communities, the value and contribution of our unique specialty will be severely curtailed. As a corollary to this issue, third parties should be entitled to rely on the reasonable medical opinions available to them if these decisions are based on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence at the time of the employment decision. Without this standard, there would be little for employers to gain in seeking assistance from appropriately trained or experienced occupational physicians.
In summary, employers and occupational physicians have a moral and legal obligation to protect the health and safety of their employees and patients. They must have the ability, in narrowly drawn circumstances where there is a legitimate threat to the workers’ own health and safety that cannot be accommodated, to recommend against the placement of a worker in a position where there is a significant risk of substantial self-injury.
