LOGICAL REVISION RE-REVISITED: ON THE WRIGHT/SALERNO CASE FOR INTUITIONISM


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Abstract

In “Revising the Logic of Logical Revision” (Philosophical Studies 99, 211–227) J. Salerno attempts to undermine Crispin Wright's recent arguments for intuitionism, and to replace Wright and Dummett's arguments with a revisionary argument of his own. I show that Salerno's criticisms of Wright involve both attributing an inference to Wright that no intuitionist would make and fallaciously treating a negative universal as an existential negative. Then I show how very general considerations about the nature of warrant undermine both Wright and Salerno's arguments, when these arguments are applied to discourses with defeasible warrants. While Salerno explicitly restricts his discussion to mathematics, Wright and Dummett intend their revisionary arguments to have much wider scope.

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