FOREWORD
THE COMING OF GAME THEORY
GUILLERMO OWEN'S PROOF OF THE MINIMAX THEOREM
ENCOURAGING A COALITION FORMATION
A COMPARISON OF NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUES
THE P-VALUE FOR COST SHARING IN MINIMUM
A UNIFIED APPROACH TO THE MYERSON VALUE AND THE POSITION VALUE
α-DECISIVENESS IN SIMPLE GAMES
MONOTONICITY OF POWER AND POWER MEASURES
ON THE MEANING OF OWEN–BANZHAF COALITIONAL VALUE IN VOTING SITUATIONS
“COUNTING” POWER INDICES FOR GAMES WITH A PRIORI UNIONS
THE DYNAMIC STABILITY OF COALITIONIST BEHAVIOUR FOR TWO-STRATEGY BIMATRIX GAMES
DYNAMIC COALITION FORMATION IN THE APEX GAME
HOW MANY PEOPLE CAN BE CONTROLLED IN A GROUP PURSUIT GAME
RELEVANCE OF WINNING COALITIONS IN INDIRECT CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS
TAKEOVER PRICES AND PORTFOLIO THEORY
A NOTE ON THE OWEN SET OF LINEAR PROGRAMMING GAMES AND NASH EQUILIBRIA
ON THE OWEN SET OF TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS
THE LOVÁSZ EXTENSION OF MARKET GAMES